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Abstract
This study is the first to use empirical analysis to address the tradeoff between financial
and social performance of microfinance institutions (MFis) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regressions are used to compare the depth and breadth of outreach of MFis.
Results indicate that for-profit MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa have less depth of outreach, indicated
by larger loan sizes, and significantly more breadth of outreach than non-profits. Results support
the conclusion that for-profit MFis grant more loans overall, but these loans do not necessarily
reach the poorest clients. Ultimately, both for-profit and non-profit MFis provide access to
banking services that are traditionally unobtainable for their clients; they simply address different
target markets in doing so.
Introduction
In the growing movement for poverty alleviation, Microfinance Institutions (MFis) have
been pivotal institutions over the past two decades, enabling millions of impoverished people to
work towards a better standard of living. MFis directly fight poverty by providing access to
banking services that are traditionally unobtainable for low-income clients. Although all MFis
were originally small non-profit companies whose sole mission was to maximize outreach, the
industry is quickly evolving and these institutions are facing increasing pressure from various
stakeholders to reduce their dependence on subsidies and donations to become self-sustaining
businesses. There are now many for-profit MFis that seek the same mission of expanding access
to credit, but now focus on becoming sustainable and maximizing profits.
This change in focus has resulted in a "double bottom line", measured by both social
performance and financial performance. Because it is very difficult to maximize both social
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impact and financial performance, many stakeholders argue that for-profit and non-profit MFis
belong to different communities and should not be held to the same measures of performance.
For profit MFis are expected to be more self-sustainable and profitable, resulting in an objective
that is easily measured with financial ratios, while non-profits are normally more sensitive to the
environmental, Social and developmental impacts of their activities because these impacts are
typically their main focus in business. These contrasting business models make it difficult to
judge the virtuous course in the MFI industry. The purpose of this study is to address the impact
of profitability and sustainability on the performance of MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It is important to have an accurate answer to this research question because this "double
bottom line" may, in fact, be compromising outreach to the poor in exchange for increased
profitability and sustainability. If this is the case, it must be realized sooner than later, before the
microfinance industry drifts away from its original mission of poverty alleviation. Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regressions will be run in the empirical analysis section of this study to help
determine if MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa are facing a tradeoff from contrasting measures of
performance.
Review of Relevant Literature
There are few studies that directly address the impact of profitability or self-sustainability
on MFI outreach, but there are studies that analyze similar research questions. Gutierrez-nieto,
Serrano-Cinca, and Mar Molinero (2009) use data from 2003 to study the efficiency of 89 MFis
in relation to financial and social outputs using data envelopment analysis. They find that social
efficiency does not necessarily lead to financial inefficiency and that there is a significant
positive relationship between efficiency in supporting women and efficiency in fighting poverty.
They also report that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are more socially efficient than
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other organizational structures. In addition, the idea for the key dependent variable of outreach to
the poor came from this analysis. Despite the findings of this study, the data envelopment
method used to analyze these relationships makes it difficult to analyze the true impact of
different variables on social performance.
In addition, Kar (2011) looks at factors which have impacts on several performance
indicators of MFis including profitability or sustainability, repayment status and cost indicators.
He uses OLS robust regressions to run several different regressions in order to analyze 426 MFis
in 81 countries. The results of this study indicate that MFis can still attain sustainability without
necessarily increasing average loan size or interest earning. Increasing the breadth of outreach
was also found to help attain sustainability while avoiding mission drift. Although this study
addresses the impact of breadth of outreach on sustainability, it does not explore the idea that
sustainability impacts breadth of outreach.
Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) address the impact of interest rates on
repayment rates and profitability, investigate the tradeoff between depth of outreach to the poor
and profitability, and assess the idea of mission drift. Using a series of OLS regressions, the
authors analyze 124 MFis in 49 countries from 1999-2002. They find that it is possible to serve
the poor and still earn profits, but there is a clear tradeoff between the contrasting objectives of
serving the poorest and earning profits. However, the authors conclude that institutions that have
smaller loan sizes do not necessarily generate less profit. Despite these findings, the authors
neglect to acknowledge that the profit status of an MFI has an impact on their average loan sizes.
Olivares-Polanco (2005) argues that commercialization, which is characterized by
profitability and regulation, may lead to larger loan sizes and less depth of outreach. This study
focuses on 28 MFis in Latin America with older data. The results of his regressions indicate that

5

the type of institution has no effect on loan size and the models confirm that there is a trade-off
between depth and sustainability. This study lacks many explanatory variables and focuses
mainly on the credit methodology ofMFis as the key explanatory variable.
This study differs from the previous literature because it uses outreach and average loan
size as dependent variables. Also, this study focuses on a sample of MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa,
where microfinance is relatively new. Because microfinance is a newer institution in the region,
there is little literature regarding any sort of impact or performance ofMFis in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In addition, the data set for this study is more current than the data sets of previously
reviewed literature.
Data
The data set for this study is panel data that encompasses 408 different MFis in 32 Sub
Saharan African countries from 2002-2009. All data was collected from the Microfinance
Information eXchange (MIX), a non-profit organization that has become the largest web-based
MFI information resource and is designed to promote transparency of information in the
industry. The data is adjusted to make comparisons across MFis more relevant for publication in
the MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB). All data is publicly available on the MIX webpage
(www.mixmarket.org). Because data submission to this organization is completely voluntary, an
unbalanced panel results. Therefore, the dataset for this study was reduced to 953 observations
for which there is complete data.
In addition, because submission of data is voluntary, it can be assumed that low
performers do not disclose as much information to the public. Therefore, the sample set may be
skewed towards MFis that stress profitability and financial objectives resulting in selection bias
regarding the information available. The level of information disclosure is revealed by MIX,
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however, using a "diamond" system where the highest rank is five diamonds. This allows
investors and researchers to know the quality of the information they are getting from the
webpage. On the following page, Table 1 lists the summary statics of relevant variables in the
collected data.
Table I. Summary Statistics
Variable Name

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of Active Borrowers

953

29296.4

75346.99

18

715969

Loan Balance per Borrower

953

1.039

1.672

.013

26.026

Return on Assets

953

-0.027

0.148

-0.906

0.599

Operational Self-Sufficiency

953

1.065

0.756

0

19.383

Profit Status

953

0.369

0.483

0

I

Bank

953

0.067

0.250

0

I

Credit Union/ Cooperative

953

0.266

0.442

0

I

NBFI

953

0.309

0.463

0

I

NGO

953

0.319

0.466

0

I

Rural Bank

953

0.037

0.191

0

l

Percent of Women Borrowers

953

0.61 I

0.257

0

1.642

Portfolio Quality: PAR>30

953

0.089

0.122

0

1.054

Age of the MF!: Mature

953

0.551

0.497

0

I

Age of the MF!: Young

953

0.181

0.386

0

I

Age of the MF!: New

953

0.182

0.386

0

1

Total Assets

953

l.80e+07

7.00e+07

2590

l .27e+09

Cost per Borrower

953

139.933

268.206

0

4374

Borrowers per Loan Officer

635

335.998

278.098

12

1967

Econometric Model
The goal of this study is to analyze the impact of profitability and sustainability factors, as well
as other factors that literature suggests may have an impact on the breadth and depth, or quantity
and quality, of outreach. OLS regressions are utilized in this study to identify which variables are
the best predictors of outreach. Because the sample is panel data, both country and year dummy
variables are being utilized as fixed effects to correct for the component of the error term that
accounts for the unobserved impact of time-invariant variables (such as the for-profit dummy
variable).
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Dependent Variables
Outreach. For this study, outreach is measured by the number of active borrowers. It is an
indicator of not only the breadth of outreach, but also the scale which is inversely related with
costs and positively related with profitability (Kar 2011 ). Number of active borrowers is a
standard measure of the sheer quantity of outreach. Higher breadth of outreach is typically
associated with for-profit MFis.
Loan Balance per Borrower. Loan balance per borrower is measured by the adjusted average
loan balance per borrower divided by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. Deflating the
average loan balance by GNI per capita adjusts for a country's overall wealth and standardizes
the measurement of average loan balance. Loan balance per borrower is a common measure of
the quality of outreach and indicates the depth of outreach. Smaller average loan size is
associated with better depth of outreach to the poor (Cull et al., 2007). In regards to the "double
bottom line", better depth of outreach is typically a measure of social performance. Therefore, it
is expected that non-profit MFis will have smaller loan sizes and better depth of outreach.
Explanatory Variables
Return on Assets. Return on Assets (ROA) is a standard measure of profitability, generated by
the ratio of adjusted net operating income after taxes over adjusted average total assets. ROA is a
good indicator of how well an MFI uses its assets to generate returns (Kar 2011). There is also an
argument that MFls must be profitable in order to be sustainable, and the best measure of
profitability in this case is ROA (Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2009). In addition, ROA is a better
indicator than Return on Equity (ROE), which is can be distorted by subsidies and financing
structures used by the different types of MFis (Olivares-Polanco 2005). ROA is expected to have
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a positive impact on the breadth of outreach. It is also expected to increase loan size, which in
tum will have a negative effect on depth of outreach to the poor.
Operational Self-Sustainability. Operational Self-Sustainability (OSS) is another measure of
MFI sustainability, which is the ratio of financial revenue to operating expenses which include
financial expense, impairment losses on loans, and operating expenses. OSS measures how well
an MFI utilizes its operating revenues to cover its costs. OSS is a better sustainability proxy than
Financial Self-Sustainability (FSS) because donors have long term control of OSS through
·monitoring processes, resulting in a more reliable estimate of MFI sustainability (Kar 2011).
OSS is expected to increase both breadth of outreach and loan size, resulting in less depth of
outreach to the poor.
Profit Status. The profit dummy variable is equal to one when the MFI is designated as for
profit and equal to zero when it is a non-profit. For-profit firms are expected to have more
overall breadth of outreach and have larger loan sizes. This is due to the basic assumption that
higher profits typically expand the breadth of outreach (number of borrowers) but decrease the
depth of outreach (benefit to the poorest) (Olivares-Polanco 2005).
Charter Type. Five different charter types: banks, credit unions and cooperatives, non-bank
financial institutions (NBFis), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and rural banks are
represented by a series of charter type dummy variables. Banks, rural banks, and most NBFis are
for-profit organizations, so they are expected to have higher breadth of outreach and larger loan
sizes. NGOs and credit unions are non-profit organizations, so they are expected to have lower
breadth of outreach and smaller loan sizes than the other charter types.
Additional Variables. Additional variables are defined on the following page in Table 2.
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Table 2. Variable Names and Definitions
Variable Name

Return on Assets (ROA)

Variable Description
Overall Breadth of
Outreach Indicator
Depth of Outreach to the
Poor Indicator
Profitability Indicator

Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS)

Sustainability Indicator

Profit Status (PROFIT)
Bank
Credit Union/Cooperative

Profit Status Indicator
Charter Type Indicator
Charter Type Indicator

(Adjusted Net Operating Income - Taxes)/ Adjusted Average Total Assets
Financial Revenue/ (Financial Expense+ Impairment Losses on Loans +
Operating Expense)
Dummy variable where I =For profit firm and 0=Not for profit firm
Dummy variable where !=Bank and 0=otherwise
Dummy variable where !=Credit Union/Cooperative and 0=otherwise

NBFI

Charter Type Indicator

Dummy variable where I =NBFI and 0=otherwise

NGO

Charter Type Indicator

Dummy variable where !=NGO and 0=otherwise

Rural Bank

Age of the MFI: Mature

Charter Type Indicator
Social Performance
Indicator
Social Performance and
Risk Indicator
Firm Age Control Variable

Dummy variable where !=Rural Bank and 0=otherwise
Number of active women borrowers/ Adjusted Number of Active
Borrowers
Outstanding balance, portfolio overdue> 30 Days+ renegotiated portfolio/
Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio
Dummy variable where I =Mature (>8 yrs) and 0=otherwise

Age of the MF!: Young

Firm Age Control Variable

Dummy variable where !=Young (5-8 yrs) and 0=otherwise

Age of the MF!: New

Firm Age Control Variable
Firm Size Control
Variable

Dummy variable where I =New (0-4 yrs) and 0=otherwise
Total Assets, adjusted for Inflation and standardized provisioning for loan
impairment and write-offs
Adjusted Operating Expense/ Adjusted Average Number of Active
Borrowers
Adjusted Number of Loans Outstanding/ Number of Loan Officers

Number of Active Borrowers
Loan Balance per Borrower

Percent of Women Borrowers
Portfolio Quality (PAR>30)

Total Assets
Cost per Borrower

Efficiency Indicator

Borrowers per Loan Officer

Efficiency Indicator
Fixed Effects Control
Variable
Fixed Effects Control
Variable

Country Dummy Variables
Year Dummy Variables

Definition
Number of borrowers with loans outstanding, adjusted for standardized
write-offs
Adjusted Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per capita

Identify which country the MF! operates in
Identify the years of operation for relevant data

Results and Discussion
Outreach Models
To assess the determinants of outreach, three different specifications are used (Table 3).
Regression 1 shows expected results.
•

For-profit MFis have significantly more outreach than non-profits ceteris paribus. This
result relates back to one of the key motivations of this study; the idea that for-profit
MFis have higher breadth of outreach.

•

As loan balance per borrower increases by one unit outreach significantly decreases by
2,568. This is initially a surprising result because larger loan size is typically associated
with for-profit firms that have higher breadth of outreach. However, theoretically this

10
result makes sense due to the logic that spreading the total loan portfolio over more
clients will cause the average loan size to decrease as breadth of outreach increases.
•

Outreach significantly decreases by 15.60 as cost per borrower increases by one unit. The
relationship may be explained by the idea that costs per borrower decrease from
economies of scale as outreach increases, leading to a question regarding the causality of
the relationship. However, theoretically the variable must be included to control for
different levels of efficiency across different MFis.

•

Outreach significantly decreases by 30,324 as portfolios at risk greater than 30 days
increase by one unit. This result is easily explained by the association between lower
outreach and non-profits, which make riskier loans to poorer clients.

•

Increasing total assets by one unit results in significant increase of .000705 in outreach.
This result is explained by the idea that for-profits tend to be larger than non-profits, and
therefore have more breadth of outreach.

•

More mature MFis have significantly more outreach than young MFis. It is likely that
more mature MFis are larger and more efficient than young MFis, resulting in more
breadth of outreach.
A comparison of the first two specifications show that using a series of charter type

dummy variables does not result in any more explanatory power than simply using a for
profit dummy variable. However, it is interesting that in Regression 2, the Rural Bank charter
type dummy is omitted, resulting in the conclusion that NBFis have significantly more
outreach than Rural Banks. Although both of these charter types are typically for-profit
institutions, Rural Banks are typically much smaller.In Regression 3, an interaction term with
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the profit status dummy variable and ROA is included to investigate if for-profit MFis that
. are more profitable have a different amount of outreach than non-profit MFis.
Table 3. OLS Regression Estimates ofExolanatorv Variable Impacts on Outreach
Outreach
(2)
(I )
(3)
PROFIT
11,451***
-96,840*
(3,174)
(52,484)
Bank
12,146
(11,005)
Credit Union
-690.8
(5,533)
NBFI
12,271**
(4,917)
NGO
5,150
(4, I 08)
ROA
12,709
17,022
25,771**
(27,953)
(28,721)
(11,515)
PROFIT*ROA
-237,672**
(93,791)
Operational Self-Sufficiency
5,505
5,575
-1,166
(15,162)
(15,358)
(2,906)
PROFIT*OSS
98,645**
(49,433)
Loan Balance per Borrower
-2,568**
-2,392**
-2,601**
(1,105)
(1,099)
(1,165)
Percent of Women Borrowers
-2,654
-6,656
2,235
(7,025)
(7,313)
(6,813)
PAR>30
-30,324***
-29,129***
-23,646**
(10,484)
(10,828)
(9,644)
Total Assets
0.000705*** 0.000709*** 0.000672***
(0.000127)
(0.000134)
(0.000126)
Cost per Borrower
-15.60*
-15.29*
-15.46*
(8,267)
(9.046)
(8.119)
Age: Mature
15,454***
14,315***
12,954***
(4,043)
(3,676)
(3,876)
Age: New
423.1
-293.9
-205.7
(3,318)
(3,295)
(3,412)
Constant
2,556
3,175
14,499
(22,123)
(23,281)
(9,789)
Observations
953
953
953
R-squared
0.596
0.595
0.638
All models estimated via OLS with Robust standard errors
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, * * p<0.05, * p<0.l
*Fixed Effects Country and year variable results not shown
Source: Calculations based on data from the Microfinance Information eXchange, Inc.
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An interaction term with the profit status dummy variable and OSS is also included in the
regression to explore the idea that for-profit MFis with higher self-sufficiency may have a
different amount of outreach than non-profits. When these interaction terms are added to the
model, the overall fit of the equation improves. The regression results indicate interesting
findings:
•

Increasing ROA in non-profit firms has a significant positive impact on outreach, but
increasing ROA in for-profit firms has a significant negative impact on outreach. The
result regarding for-profit firms is difficult to explain, leading to a question regarding
the causality of the relationship between outreach and ROA. It is possible that less
outreach is driving some factor of ROA.

•

Increasing OSS in a for-profit firm has a significant positive impact on outreach, but
increasing OSS in a non-profit firm does not have a significant impact on outreach.
This is easily explained by the idea that non-profit MFis are not designed to be self
sufficient.

•

The marginal effect of PROFIT across the dummy variable and interaction terms,
evaluated at the mean values of explanatory variables is 14843.40.

All three regressions above were run with and without observations from South Africa to
test the assumption that it may be an outlier due to its wealthier economy. Dropping the
observations did not produce any significant findings, so the observations for South Africa were
included in the final regressions. Overall, profit status, loan size, and portfolio quality seem to be
key drivers of MFI outreach. Controlling for firm size, costs per borrower, and age are also
significant in the equation. The results are consistent with the initial assumption that for-profit
firms have more outreach.
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Loan Size Models

To assess the determinants of outreach, two different specifications are used (Table 4).
Regression 1 shows the following results.
•

For-profit MFis have significantly larger loans than non-profits ceteris paribus. This
finding relates back to one of the key motivations of the study; the idea that for-profit
MFis make many large loans but are not necessarily making the small loans to the poor
that are needed the most.

•

As operational self-sufficiency increases by one unit, loan size significantly increases by
.453. This may be explained by the relationship between increased OSS and for-profit
firms, which are associated with larger loans.

•

Loan size significantly decreases by 1.176 as percent of women borrowers increases by
one unit. This finding may be explained by the idea that income inequality causes women
to be poorer than men in Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to smaller loans and increased
depth of outreach.

•

As the number of active borrowers increases by one unit, loan size significantly decreases
by .00000172. This is a surprising result due to the original assumption that increasing
the breadth of outreach will increase loan size and decrease depth of outreach.
Theoretically this result makes sense due to the logic that spreading the total loan
portfolio over more clients will cause the average loan size to decrease as breadth of
outreach increases. However, this result could be interpreted to mean that there is not
necessarily a tradeoff between increasing the number of loans and making smaller loans.

•

As borrowers per loan officer increases by one unit, loan size significantly decreases by
.00131. Theoretically, if holding loan officers constant, this may be related to the finding
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that loan size decreases as number of active borrowers increases. However, correlation
coefficients show that the two variables are not highly correlated.
•

Increasing total assets by one unit results in a significant increase of .00000000224 in
loan size. This result is explained by the idea that for-profits are larger than non-profits,
and therefore have larger loan sizes.
Table 4. OLS Regression Estimates ofExolanatorv Variable Impacts on Loan Size
Loan Balance per Borrower
(1)
(2)
1.514**
0.353***
PROFIT
(0.603)
(0.136)
0.0997
0.390
ROA
(0.439)
(0.471)
0.381
0.453*
Operational Self-Sufficiency
(0.273)
(0.301)
-1.176***
-0.704*
Percent of Women Borrowers
(0.400)
(0.372)
-1.461*
PROFIT*Women Borrowers
(0.746)
-2.0le-06***
-1.72e-06***
Number of Active Borrowers
(6.67e-07)
(6.15e-07)
0.570
-0.529
PAR>30
(0.719)
(0.632)
-3.223**
PROFIT*PAR>30
(1.556)
-0.00129***
-0.00131***
Borrowers per Loan Officer
(0.000237)
(0.000249)
2.46e-09***
2.24e-09***
Total Assets
(5.93e-10)
(5.61e-10)
-0.00549
-0.0489
Age: Mature
(0.133)
(0.141)
-0.206
-0.233
Age: Young
(0.263)
(0.268)
1.216*
1.819***
Constant
(0.649)
(0.730)

I

634
634
Observations
0.388
0.369
R-squared
All models estimated via OLS withRobust standard errors
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.l
*Fixed Effects Country andyear variable results not shown
Source: Calculations based on data from the Microfinance Information cXchange, Inc.
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In Regression 2, an interaction term with the profit status dummy variable and percent of
women borrowers is included to investigate if for-profit MFis that have a higher percentage of
women borrowers have a different average loan size than non-profit MFis. An interaction term
with the profit status dummy variable and portfolios at risk greater than thirty days is also
included in the regression to explore the idea that for-profit MFis with better portfolio quality
may have a different average loan size than non-profits. Adding these interaction terms improves
the overall fit of the equation. The regressions results indicate interesting findings:
•

Increasing percent of women borrowers in non-profit firms has a significant negative
impact on loan size. Increasing percent of women borrowers in for-profit firms has even
more of a significant negative impact on loan size. These significant negative impacts on
loan size are interpreted as decreasing loan size, and improving depth of outreach to the
poor.

•

Increasing portfolio risk in a for-profit firm has a significant negative impact on loan size,
resulting in smaller loans. However, increasing portfolio risk in a non-profit firm does not
have a significant impact on loan size. This raises a questio:q. regarding the causality of
the relationship between portfolio risk and loan size. It is possible that smaller loans
made to poorer clients are more risky than larger loans made to less poor clients.

•

The marginal effect of PROFIT across the dummy variable and interaction terms,
evaluated at the mean values of explanatory variables is 0.34025.
Overall, profit status, number of active borrowers, percent of women borrowers, and

portfolio quality seem to be key drivers of MFI average loan size. Controlling for firm size and
borrowers per loan officer are also significant in the equation. The results are consistent with the
initial assumption that for-profit firms have larger average loan sizes.
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Heteroskedasticity
In the regressions above, results of Breusch-Pagan tests indicated a presence of
heteroskedasticity. Robust OLS regressions were used to correct the inconstant variances in the
standard errors of the variables. Results reported show the adjusted Robust Standard Errors.
Conclusion
This study has used empirical analysis to address the concept of a trade-off between
social performance and financial performance of MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa. Results of the
study indicate strong conclusions regarding the determinants of MFI breadth of outreach,
measured by the number of active borrowers, and depth of outreach, measured by average loan
size adjusted for GNI per capita.
In conclusion, results indicate that for-profit MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa have less depth
of outreach, indicated by larger loan sizes, and significantly more breadth of outreach than non
profits. Increased self-sustainability, which is associated with for-profit firms, also results in
larger loan sizes and decreased depth of outreach. These results indicate a clear tradeoff between
the depth and breadth of outreach. This tradeoff supports the assumption that focusing on self
sustainability and financial performance ultimately results in more loans, but these larger loans
are not necessarily reaching the poorest clients that need the loans most.
Results also indicate that increasing percent of women borrowers in both for-profit and
non-profit MFls results in significantly smaller average loan sizes. This is an exceptional
measure of social performance, explained by the idea that income inequality causes women to
typically be poorer than men in Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to smaller loans for women and
increased depth of outreach. The impact on outreach of increasing the percent of women
borrowers was inconclusive.
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These conclusions are subject to a number oflimitations. It is important to recognize that
the conclusions made in this study only apply to MFis in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, results
are subject to alternative interpretations based on social and financial objectives ofthe individual
MFis included in the sample set. Obvious questions of causality arose in this study that are
evident opportunities for future research. These endogeneity issues have been mentioned in other
literature, but have yet to be addressed with a satisfactory solution.
This study has supported the concept ofa tradeoff resulting from the "double bottom
line" of the microfinance industry. Because it is very difficult to maximize both overall breadth
of outreach and depth of outreach to the poor, for-profit and non-profit MFis should not be held
to the same measures ofperformance. These two different types ofbusinesses clearly have
different financial and social missions and are designed to function in ways that will allow them
to accomplish their objectives. As long as information remains transparent to the public,
especially investors and researchers, for-profit MFis are shall be held to financial performance
standards and non-profits shall be assessed by their social and developmental impacts. In the end,
both for-profit and non-profit MFis are providing access to banking services that are traditionally
unobtainable for their clients; they just address different target markets in doing so.
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